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Union Authorization Cards: Linden's
Peacemaking Potential
The National Labor Relations Act' has always sanctioned authoriza-
tion cards as a means for employees to designate or select a bargaining
representative.2 Yet the circumstances in which an employer is re-
quired to bargain with a union which has an authorization card ma-
jority have varied over the past 25 years since the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act.2 Recently the Supreme Court agreed to hear two cases4
which present the question whether the existence of an authorization
card majority by itself activates the employer's duty to bargain where
other means to select a bargaining representative are available. This
Note evaluates the policy underlying the use of authorization cards
and the practical problems presented by their use. It suggests that the
Supreme Court should not decide the ultimate issue of the use of the
cards but should remand the cases to the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) with instructions to develop rules for card use which
are consistent with the Act's purpose. Finally, the Note proposes rules
the NLRB should develop and the procedure it should follow when
presented with an authorization card dispute.
I. The Cards
Authorization cards are generally of two types. The first type is the
unambiguous, single purpose authorization card, by which the em-
ployee authorizes the union to act as his sole bargaining agent under
the National Labor Relations Act.5 The second type, the dual purpose
card, requests a representation election, and also authorizes the union
to act as the sole bargaining representative0 in much the same manner
as the first type of card.
1. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, Act of June 23, 1947, ch.
120, 61 Stat. 136, Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 541, codified in
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970).
2. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); United Mine Workers v.
Arkansas Oak Flooring, 351 U.S. 62 (1956); Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944);
NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
3. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136.
4. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305; Wilder
Mfg. Co., 81 L.R.R.M. 1039, consolidated with Linden Lumber and rev'd sub norm.
Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973) cert. granted sub
nora. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 94 S. Ct. 1967 (1974).
5. An example may be found in NLRB v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 351 F.2d 917,
918 (6th Cir. 1965). See, e.g., Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961).
6. See NLRB v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1965). The dual
purpose card is often misleading. An employee who opposes the union may sign, be-
lieving he is only requesting an election.
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The events that precede unfair labor practice litigation over the
use of authorization cards usually follow a common pattern.7 The
union, either through an employee or through a full-time union
organizer, starts an organizational drive in a particular bargaining
unit. The union usually does not inform the employer of the drive,
and occasionally it is able to keep the drive a secret until it actually
presents its recognition demand.8 When the union has cards from a
majority of the employees in an appropriate unit, it informs the em-
ployer of the majority and requests recognition and bargaining.0
Employer responses are varied. 10 If the employer was aware of the
drive, he may already have attempted some form of anti-union cam-
paign. If he was not, he might initiate such a campaign after the bar-
gaining request. In either case, he is likely to investigate union support
on his own. Eventually, the employer may petition the Board for an
election," not wishing to recognize a union on the sole basis of authori-
zation cards; or he may tell the union to petition for an election,
believing that the burden is on the union to demonstrate its majority
status; 12 or he may deny or ignore the union's request.13
Occasionally the union files an election petition with the Board at
the same time that it presents its bargaining demand to the employ-
ers. 14 If the union does so, the election will proceed, unless employer
7. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 895 U.S. 575 (1969); Crawford Mfg. Co.
v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 867, 869 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Swan Super Cleaners, Inc., 384
F.2d 609, 614 (6th Cir. 1967).
8. See, e.g., NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 886 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB
v. Swan Super Cleaners, Inc., 884 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Gotham Shoe
Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Koehler, 328 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964);
Comment, Union Authorization Cards: A Reliable Basis for an NLRB Order to Bargain?,
47 TXAS L. REv. 87, 89 (1968); Note, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805,
823-28 (1966).
9. An employer must "bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970). Section
159(a) provides that "representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining by the majority of the employees . . . shall be the exclusive repre-
sentatives of all the employees . . . for the purposes of collective bargaining .... "
10. Of course, the employer might simply recognize' the union, but then unfair
labor practice litigation would probably not occur.
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1970).
12. See, e.g., Dayco Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 577, 578 (6th Cir. 1967).
18. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 895 U.S. 575, 594 (1969). Both the opinion
and the transcript of the oral argument are ambiguous on whether an employer may
say "no comment" or whether he must tell the union that he wants it to petition
for an election. Transcript of Oral Argument on behalf of Petitioner at 3, 16, NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co., 895 U.S. 575 (1969).
14. Before Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277, 56 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1964),
the NLRB required a union to choose between an election and an unfair labor
practice proceeding charging a refusal to bargain. Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 N.L.R.B.
1864 (1954). Although the change from Aiello has been criticized, Note, supra note 8,
at 816, the new policy appears to be responsible for an increase in the number of
elections stemming from authorization card disputes. See Gordon, Union Authorization
Cards and the Duty to Bargain, 19 LAB. L.J. 201 (1968).
1690
Union Authorization Cards: Linden's Peacemaking Potential
unfair labor practices' 0 so disrupt "laboratory conditions"'16 as to make
the holding of a fair election improbable. 17 If such disruption has
occurred, the union generally withdraws its election petition or moves
to have the election voided (if the unfair practices did not come to
light until after the voting). It then files a refusal-to-bargain charge
against the employer on the basis of the authorization card majority.
Even without petitioning for an election, however, the union might
still pursue a refusal-to-bargain charge against the employer, relying
likewise on the card majority as the basis of its charge.' 8
In either case, trying a refusal-to-bargain charge requires the NLRB
to determine whether a genuine majority of the employees indeed
supported the union at the time when it presented its bargaining re-
quest to management.' 0 Such a determination from the evidence of
the cards requires the NLRB to judge whether any of the cards should
be invalidated because of the effects of union misconduct during the
card drive, or because the cards on their faces would tend to mislead
employees.20 If the NLRB finds that the union did have a majority,
15. The unfair labor practices usually involve: threats of reprisals or promises of
benefits, or interrogation or surveillance of employees, violating 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1970), or discrimination in hiring, firing or laying-off employees because of their
union activities, violating 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
16. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948).
17. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 50 L.R.R.M. 1949 (1962). See 29 NLRB
ANN. REP. 57-58 (1964).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970). If the union that holds the card majority has truly
been "designated or selected" by whatever means, including authorization cards, then
the union has the right to a bargaining order from the NLRB when the employer
refuses to bargain. This possibility of two remedies (election and a refusal-to-bargain
charge) was the major factor prompting the dissent in and criticism of the NLRB's
Bernel Foam decision, 146 N.L.R.B. 1277, 1288, 56 L.R.R.M. 1039, 1043 (1964) (Leedom,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Note, supra note 8, at 816.
19. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969); Christensen & Christensen,
Gissel Packing and "Good Faith Doubt": The Gestalt of Required Recognition of Unions
under the NLRA, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 411, 422 (1970); Welles, The Obligation to Bargain
on the Basis of a Card Majority, 3 GA. L. REv. 349, 357-59 (1969). See Rains, Authoriza-
tion Cards as an Indefensible Basis for Board Directed Union Representation Status:
Fact and Fancy, 18 LAn. L.J. 227, 230 (1967). Both Bok and the NLRB have stated
that an order to bargain may be appropriate even where the union never had a
majority, if the employer's unfair labor practices are of "such a nature that their
coercive effects cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies," NLRB
v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 570 (4th Cir. 1967); Bok, The Regulation
of Campaigns in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act,
78 HARv. L. REV. 38, 134-39 (1964). See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,
613-14 (1969); J.C. Penney Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 384 F.2d 479, 485-86 (10th Cir. 1967);
United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
20. See, e.g., NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967); Levi
Strauss & Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 732, 68 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1968); Cumberland Shoe Corp.,
144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963); Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961). The NLRB's policy,
articulated in Snow & Sons and refined in Cumberland Shoe, has been that a few bad
apples will not spoil the bunch: even where a pattern of union misrepresentation or
coercion exists, the NLRB will invalidate only those cards which are proved to have
been signed under threats or misapprehensions of the card's purpose. Snow & Sons,
134 N.L.R.B. at 710.
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it may then issue a bargaining order.21 However, in a case where an
election petition had been filed, if the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices were not so serious as to make a fair election improbable, the
NLRB may order an election to proceed, or it may order a rerun
election.22
II. The National Labor Relations Act
An important purpose of the National Labor Relations Act has been
to facilitate industrial democracy 23 by safeguarding employees' rights
to organize and to choose a bargaining representative.2 4 The Act has
established procedures which bind an employer to bargain with the
chosen representative, if the employees decide to organize.2  Board-
conducted elections have provided the "preferred route" for either the
designation of a bargaining representative or the expression of a deci-
sion against unionization. 26 Nevertheless, the Act has always sanctioned
other methods for the employees to express their choice.27
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. validated authorization cards as one
such alternate route.28 The union in Gissel requested the employer
to bargain based on its majority status as demonstrated by cards rather
than an election. The employer refused, meanwhile engaging in mis-
conduct which precluded the holding of a fair election. The Board
21. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969).
22. See, e.g., Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
23. See Louis D. Brandeis, Statement, U.S. COMM'N ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, FINAL
REPORT, S. Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong., Ist Sess. 7659-60 (1916). See also id. at 62-64.
24. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1970), which demonstrate a congressional purpose to
protect an employee's right of free choice to decide whether to join a union, by pre-
venting employers and unions from exerting economic pressure on employees to dis-
courage or encourage unionization.
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970) (establishing NLRB conducted elections); 29 U.S.C.§ 160 (1970) (establishing procedures to adjudicate alleged violations of 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1970)).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969);
Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
27. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 595-600 (1969). There remained
little doubt, even prior to Gissel, that an employer had a duty to bargain with a
union that had been "designated or selected by a majority of the employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit," 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), even though the union had
not been so designated through a Board election. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas
Oak Flooring, 351 U.S. 62 (1956). See Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
The courts interpreted the rule to apply whenever a union presented "convincing
evidence of mnajority support." NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756,
757 (2d Cir. 1940). However, as what constitutes "convincing evidence" has never been
defined, the NLRB's practice since Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966), has been
to allow an employer confronted with a bargaining demand based on cards to request
an election unless he has prevented, by his own conduct, the holding of a fair election.
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 592-93.
28. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 601 (1969). In overruling the Fourth
Circuit, the Supreme Court deferred to the Board's practice. Id. at 602-03.
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ordered the employer to bargain, and the Supreme Court held that
such an order, grounded on the cards, was valid where a ,fair election
was unlikely.2 9 However, the Court left it to the NLRB to decide
when a bargaining order based on authorization cards would best
effectuate the purposes of the Act.3 0 The Board's basis for making this
decision in individual cases has evolved over the past 40 years, as
changing ideas and new industrial practices have required new meth-
ods to protect employee free choice.
Under the Wagner Act,3 ' the Board could certify a union whenever
the union represented a majority of the employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit.3 2 Elections were not required, and employers were
not permitted to petition for an election. 33 Unions frequently used
authorization cards as a means of evidencing majority support.3 4
Against this background, the Supreme Court decided Franks Bros. Co.
v. NLRB.3 5 The NLRB had ordered an employer to bargain with a
union which lost its majority after the employer wrongfully refused
to bargain with it. The Supreme Court held that the NLRB was
within its statutory authority,3 6 noting that the bargaining order was
intended to deter employer misconduct in order to protect employee
rights.3 7
Three years after Frank Bros., Congress passed the Taft-Hfartley
Act,3 8 which gave an employer a right to petition for an election in
certain circumstances.3 9 In Joy Silk Mills,40 the leading early authori-
zation card case under Taft-Hartley, the NLRB held that an employer
confronted with a bargaining demand based on authorization cards
29. Id. at 580-84, 610-15.
30. Id. at 610, 614-15.
31. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1970), allowing an employer petition, was not added
until passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136. The NLRB did permit
employers presented with bargaining demands from two unions to petition for an election.
See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 599 & nn.15, 16 (1969).
34. See, e.g., Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944); NLRB v. Remington
Rand, 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
35. 321 U.S. 702 (1944), aff'g 137 F.2d 989 (Ist Cir. 1943), enforcing 44 N.L.R.B. 898
(1942).
36. 321 U.S. at 705. The union initially had authorization cards from a majority of
the employees. The employer refused to bargain, so the union petitioned for an
election. The union lost, but the NLRB found the employer guilty of violations of
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(5) (1970), voided the election, and issued a bargaining
order. Even though the union had lost its original majority due to employee turnover,
the Court held that the bargaining order was appropriate.
37. 321 U.S. at 705.
38. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1970).
40. 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 914 (1951).
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could petition for an election only if he entertained a "good faith
doubt" of the union's majority.41 The right to petition was limited so
that an employer who had no bona fide doubts about the union's
majority status was not permitted to gain time during which to dis-
sipate the union's majority by invoking the NLRB's election process.42
The good faith test required the NLRB to evaluate the employer's
actions to determine his subjective state of mind at the time of the
petition for an election. Employer unfair labor practices that tended
to undermine the union's support were taken as evidence that the
employer lacked good faith doubt of the union's majority status. 43 In
effect, the burden was on the employer to prove good faith.
In 1965, the Board made it easier for the employer to meet the good
faith test. In John P. Serpa, Inc. 44 five of the employer's seven salesmen
signed authorization cards. The union presented a bargaining demand,
then filed a complaint when the employer refused to bargain. Placing
the burden of proving the employer's bad faith on its own General
Counsel for the first time, the NLRB held that the burden had not
been met and dismissed the complaint.45
Then, at oral argument in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., the Board
announced that it had abandoned altogether the good faith test of
Joy S'Ik, and would permit an employer to insist on an election before
recognizing the union.46 The Board articulated only three limits on
the employer's broad prerogative: if the employer was guilty of unfair
labor practices that would prevent the holding of a fair election, if he
"knew, through a personal poll for instance, that a majority of em-
ployees supported the union,"47 or if he solely wished to contest the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit, then he had a duty to bargain
with the union and could not insist on an election. If one of the latter
two limits applies, the employer has in effect conceded that the cards
represent a true underlying union majority. Thus, the protection of
41. 85 N.L.R.B. at 1264.
42. 185 F.2d at 741.
43. Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1079 (1966). This inference is dubious. An
employer might well campaign against a union or interrogate employees even where he
does have a genuine doubt of the union's majority status. See, e.g., NLRB v. S.S. Logan
Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 568 (4th Cir. 1967).
44. 155 N.L.R.B. 99 (1965).
45. Id. at 100.
46. 395 U.S. 575, 594 (1969).
47. Id. (emphasis in original). The Board has used the phrase "independent knowl-
edge" to describe those situations where the employer knows, independently of the
cards, that the union represents a majority of his employees. Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B.
709 (1961).
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employee free choice expressed through authorization cards remains
an important goal.
In moving away from the good faith test, the NLRB's policy change
in Gissel48 contributes to that goal in another sense. The subjective
issue of the employer's state of mind in a refusal to bargain charge,
as Harry H. Rains has argued, is simply "of no importance in deter-
mining and giving effect to the employee's free choice."49 The central
issue in determining whether the employer has a duty to bargain
should be whether the union has the support of an objectively deter-
mined majority of his employees." That is, an employer's duty to
bargain should depend upon whether the majority of employees have
selected a union, not upon the reasons the employer might have had
for refusing to bargain.
III. The Unanswered Question in Gissel
The NLRB's abandonment of the good faith test, announced at oral
argument in Gissel, apparently applied to all authorization card cases.
The only issue actually addressed by the Court, however, was whether
the issuance of a bargaining order on the basis of a card majority was
an appropriate and authorized remedy under the Act in a case where
employer unfair labor practices had precluded the holding of a fair
election. Gissel held only that the cards are not so inherently unreliable
that they may never be used to support a bargaining order5 1 The
Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in two cases where a
fair election is still possible.5 2 The issue thus presented is whether
48. The change was not sudden, but was merely announced during oral argument
as the culmination of a gradual shift in Board policy during the 1960's. Transcript of
Oral Argument on behalf of Petitioner at 9-10, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575 (1969).
49. Rains, supra note 19, at 229-30. Issues that have nonetheless crept into authori-
zation card decisions include: the employer's "good faith doubt" of the union's majority
status, Joy Silk Mills, 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951); employer "independent knowledge," Snow & Sons, 134
N.L.R.B. 709, 710 (1961); and employer "willingness to have majority status determined
by an election," Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099, 1111 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. granted sub nor. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 94 S. Ct. 1967 (1974).
50. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1970), quoted in note 9 supra. In ILGWU v.
NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (commonly known as Bernhard-Altmann), the Court rejected
a defense of good faith in a proceeding involving alleged recognition of a minority
union, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970). It held that the actual existence of a union majority
was a sine qua non of recognition by the employer under the Act. Though a different
section of the Act is involved in a refusal-to-bargain proceeding, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1970), Bernhard-Altmann may suggest the importance of an objective test there as
well, and the irrelevance of the employer's state of mind.
51. 395 U.S. at 595, 601 n.18. See Christensen & Christensen, supra note 19, at 421-24.
52. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1967 (1974)
(consolidated for argument with NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 413).
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cards provide a test of employee sentiment so objective and workable
that a card majority requires a bargaining order when neither the
employer nor the union has petitioned for an election. 3
In both Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. 54 and Wilder
Manufacturing Co.,55 the union demanded recognition and bargaining
based on a card majority. The employer refused, without committing
any unfair labor practices that would tend to dissipate the union's
support or prevent the holding of a fair election. The union filed a
refusal-to-bargain charge, but the NLRB would not issue a bargaining
order. Moving still further away from any examination of the em-
ployer's state of mind or subjective motivation, the NLRB rejected
the "independent knowledge" test. 56 That test had provided one limit
to the employer's prerogative to insist upon an election when pre-
sented with a card-based bargaining demand.57 The Board will now
recognize authorization cards only where the employer has agreed to
be bound by them. 5 In addition, it has freed the employer from any
53. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3, 6-7, Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co.
v. NLRB, cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1967 (1974); Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2,
11-12, NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 413, cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1967 (1974). The question
is whether authorization cards constitute "convincing evidence of majority support,"
NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door, Inc., 112 F.2d 756, 757 (2d Cir. 1940). If they do,
then the employer should be required to bargain. The unions, however, contend that
because there were also recognitional strikes, the cards are not the only evidence in
these cases, and that the Court should allow the NLRB to consider whether strikes
and cards together constitute convincing evidence. Respondent's Brief in Opposition at
7-9, Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, supra. In contrast, the NLRB in
Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 720, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305, 1308
(1971), claimed that the question was whether, absent election interference, an em-
ployer who insists on an election must himself initiate the petition. The dissent mis-
takenly agreed that this was the question left open in Gissel, but correctly argued
that the issue was not present in this case.
54. 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1971).
55. 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972) (Second Supplemental Decision and Order).
56. See note 47 supra.
57. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 722, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305,
1309-10 (1971) (Fanning & Brown, dissenting). The Board redefined "independent knowl-
edge," limiting the term to the case where the employer has explicitly agreed to au-
thentication of the authorization cards by an impartial third party. The NLRB empha-
sized that the employer and the union had never agreed on any legal means other than
an election to determine majority status. It distinguished its decision in Snow & Sons,
134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), as involving "breach of [an] agreement to permit majority
status to be determined by other than a Board election," as well as independent
knowledge. 190 N.L.R.B. at 720, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1309. On review, the D.C. Circuit
questioned this interpretation: "[llt was represented to the Supreme Court in Gissel
that the facts of Snow & Son [sic] laid the predicate for a finding of independent
knowledge, not that a finding of 'independent knowledge' was restricted to such facts."
Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (footnote
omitted).
58. The NLRB's approach relegates the cards to three relatively minor functions:
(1) to protect an employer, should he wish to recognize the union, from charges under
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970), see ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (commonly
known as Bernhard-Altinann); (2) to protect the union, as the next best method of de-
termining majority status, when the election process has failed; and (3) to allow the
union to make the 30 percent showing necessary for an election petition, see 1969
CCH GUIDEBOOK TO LAB. REL., 402A..
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obligation to respond either to cards or to other objective evidence
of majority support.59
Reviewing these two NLRB decisions in Truck Drivers Local 413
v. NLRB, 60 the court of appeals held "that if 'independent knowledge'
is to be restricted, some alternative must be put in its place to prevent
an employer's deliberate flouting and disregard of union cards with-
out rhyme or reason."6' The court remanded the cases to the NLRB
to reconsider what option, consistent with the statute, it might wish
to follow. -02 The opinion thus protects the employees' choice as ex-
pressed on the cards, but, as the quoted passage indicates, it reinstates
some inquiry into the employer's subjective state of mind. 3 It thus
conflicts with Gissel's implicit approval of the Board's abandonment of
good faith as a standard for defining the duty to bargain. 4 The court
would, in effect, have the Board reenter "the good faith thicket of
Joy Silk"' '6 from which it extricated itself in Linden Lumber.6
Instead, the remand instructions should have required the NLRB
to develop and apply some objective means of determining employee
sentiment, not employer state of mind, and to hold the employer to
the results of that determination. 6 Certainly, such a test need not be
limited to authorization cards. 8 However, in the cases now before the
Supreme Court, 9 cards provided the primary evidence of union sup-
59. In Wilder Mfg. Co,, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972), a majority of the employees had
engaged in a recognitional strike. Nevertheless, the Board released the employer from
any obligation to bargain absent his consent to having majority status demonstrated
by a method other than a Board election.
60. 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
61. Id. at 1113.
62. Id. The court suggested one possible option: require the employer either to
recognize the union or to petition for an election himself when presented a card-based
bargain demand. Id. at 1111 & n.47.
63. The opinion concluded that if the NLRB was to abandon the "'independent
knowledge' or 'good faith' test . . . the employer must be put to some other kind
of test to evidence good faith." Id. at 1113.
64. See pp. 1694-95 & note 49 supra.
65. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1971);
Joy Silk Mills, 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 24 L.R.R.M. 1548, enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
66. 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1971).
67. An objective test of the union's status is preferable to tests of the employer's
state of mind when he refused to bargain. Not only does it protect employee rights,
but it is also consistent with the NLRB's reason for eliminating the independent
knowledge and willingness tests-practical difficulties of administration. Linden Lumber
Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305, 1309 (1971); Wilder Mfg. Co.,
81 L.R.R.M. 1039, 1040 (1970).
68. The Supreme Court in Gissel recognized that a bargaining obligation may arise
without an election, but did not hold that cards are the only possible evidence of union
support adequate to create a bargaining obligation. The Court specifically referred
to other evidence, such as "a union-called strike or strike vote," 395 U.S. at 597 (foot-
note omitted).
69. In Linden Lumber, there was a recognitional strike, and in Wilder Mfg. Co.,
there was other evidence of union support. Nevertheless, this evidence is only sup-
portive; the cards are the central focus of the cases.
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port, and the unanswered question in Gissel relates primarily to the
cards as well. 0
IV. The Reliability and Practicability of the Cards
Union authorization cards are inherently problematic. Whether
the card solicitor is an employee or a full-time union organizer, the
card drive may acquire a bandwagon effect more readily than an
election. There is a danger of threats or promises from the solicitor,71
especially if the solicitor is not versed in union affairs and is unaware
that it is illegal for the union to change seniority or job rights arbi-
trarily as reward or punishment for union support.7 2 Physical threats
may also be present.73 The potential for misrepresentation is great,74
and the employer has no opportunity to counter any union state-
ments. 75 Employees may thus be deprived of the ability to make an
informed, reasoned, and free decision regarding unionization and the
choice of bargaining representative, and their rights under the Act
to self-determination and industrial democracy may be infringed.70
Lastly, the employee has a difficult time changing his mind before
the bargaining demand is made, because of the difficulty in asking
the solicitor to return his card.71 The result is that the employee may
not favor unionization or the particular bargaining representative at
the time the union claims a majority and makes a bargaining demand. 8
70. 395 U.S. 575, 595, 601 n.18.
71. NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 565-66 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB
v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 684, 698 (2d Cir. 1966) (Timbers, J., concurring
and dissenting); Rains, supra note 19, at 231; Note, supra note 8, at 825.
72. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970).
73. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See Linden Lumber Div.,
Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718 (1971) (Trial Examiner's Decision).
74. The solicitor may misrepresent not only the purpose of the cards, but also potential
benefits from, and arguments for, unionization. See, e.g., Crawford Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
386 F.2d 367, 370 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Swan Super Cleaners, Inc., 384 F.2d 609,
615 (6th Cir. 1967); Dayco Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 577, 581-82 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB
v. S.E. Nichols Co., 380 F.2d 438, 442-44 (2d Cir. 1967); Engineers & Fabricators, Inc.
v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 482, 486-87 (5th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 359
F.2d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir.
1965); NLRB v. Koehler, 328 F.2d 770, 772-73 (7th Cir. 1965); Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B.
709 (1961).
75. See Shuman, Requiring a Union to Demonstrate Its Majority Status by Means
of an Election Becomes Riskier, 16 LAB. L.J. 426, 429 (1965).
76. See id. The employees may face economic or physical threats, contrary to the
policy of the Act that the organizational arena is to be free from all forces save
persuasion. Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election,
65 MIcH. L. REV. 851, 867 (1967). See C. SuMamRs & H. WE.LLINGTON, LABoR LAw
436-38, 472-73 (1968).
77. NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 566 (4th Cir. 1967).
78. The card process may be inaccurate, for the reasons noted above, in its re-
flection of employee sentiment. In a speech in 1962, NLRB Chairman McCulloch
presented the following statistics:
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Since the employer is often unaware of the card drive until the
union presents the cards and demands recognition and bargaining,7 9
he loses any opportunity to argue against unionization or against the
particular union.80 He loses as well some degree of industrial peace;
an unsuccessful election bars another election for at least one year,
while an unsuccessful card drive bars neither a subsequent election
nor a card drive.8' Moreover, because a card drive is often a closely
guarded secret and is conducted by only one union, rival unions are
virtually excluded from participation in the campaign.
Thus, compared with the rigor of the requirements of laboratory
conditions in an election, 2 a card drive may fail to achieve the goal
of determining whether the union is "designated or selected by a
majority of the employees." 8 3 In addition, the card process may post-
pone rather than expedite determination of majority status.84 When
the issue of majority support is eventually tried, the trial examiner
faces the absurd task of determining employee sentiment as it existed
months or years before the hearing, a process even less reliable than
the highly suspect cards.
On the other hand, the cards do have some positive value in pro-
tecting union and employee rights. If an employer has disrupted or
voided an election by his own misconduct, he should not be able to
escape his bargaining duty.85 Where unfair labor practices have been
committed, the only available means of determining employee senti-
In 58 elections, the unions presented authorization cards from 30 to 50 percent
of the employees; and they won 11 or 19% of them. In 87 elections, the unions
presented authorization cards from 50 to 70 percent of the employees; and they
won 42 or 52% [sic] of them. In 57 elections, the unions presented authorization
cards from over 70% of the employees; and they won 42, or 74% of them.
McCulloch, A Tale of Two Cities: or Law in Action in ABA SEMrXON OF LAB. REL.
LAw, 1962 PRoc. 17.
79. See note 8 supra.
80. Cf. Lesnick, supra note 76, at 855-59; Transcript of Oral Argument on behalf
of Petitioner at 3, 12-13, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
81. Conren, Inc. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1966); 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970).
82. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
84. An election, even if contested, usually takes less than two months. Comment,
Employer Recognition of Unions on the Basis of Authorization Cards: The "Inde-
pendent Knowledge" Standard, 39 U. CH. L. REv. 314, 325 nA8 (1972); 37 NLRB
ANN. REP. 13 (1972) (median time of 45 days). In contrast, a refusal to bargain pro-
ceeding may take a year or more, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 611
n.30 (1969) (median time of 388 days). Wilder Mfg. Co., 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972), has
not yet been resolved; the card drive took place in October 1965.
85. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 702 (1944). This assumes that the union did have a majority at one time that
was destroyed by the employer's unlawful conduct. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575, 613-14 (1969); Welles, supra note 19, at 359-60.
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ment prior to the election may be the cards."6 Of course, employee
views might have changed during a proper campaign, but the em-
ployer cannot be heard to complain about not being allowed to influ-
ence employee choice when he has abused the right. In such situations,
cards provide the only alternative to employer victory. However un-
reliable, they surpass a void election in determining employee senti-
ment.87 As Gissel recognized, they cannot be wholly discounted.
The Board should therefore not preclude an employer from defend-
ing against a union recognition demand on the grounds that the union
coerced or deceived the employees into signing the cards. The em-
ployer is the only party who could effectively raise an objection to
such a violation of the employees' right of free choice. Indeed, the
employer should be allowed to raise such a defense so that he may
avoid violating another provision of the Act: he is prohibited from
bargaining with a union that does not represent a majority of his
employees. 8  If the employees were coerced or deceived into signing
union cards, the union coercion or deception vitiates employee con-
sent, in much the same manner that employer coercion will invalidate
a vote against unionization in a Board-conducted election. 9
Employers typically raise the defense of union coercion or mis-
representation in a refusal-to-bargain proceeding involving authoriza-
tion cards. 90 Of course, this defense is also available to an employer
after an election,91 requiring the same type of litigation. But whereas
union coercion voids an entire election, 92 union coercion or misrepre-
sentation in a card drive invalidates only the cards of those proven
to have been the subject of the misconduct. 93 Needless to say, it is
unlikely that every instance of union coercion in a card drive is de-
tected, especially if the drive is kept secret. In contrast, an election
is always a public affair. The card process therefore delays recognition
86. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 601 n.18; NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson
& Co., Inc., 386 F.2d 551, 554, 556 (4th Cir. 1967) (Sobeloff, J., concurring specially);
Sheinkman, Recognition of Unions Through Authorization Cards, 3 GA. L. REv. 319,
328-29 (1969).
87. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). This feature has prompted many
cases and comments to favor a bargaining order in these cases. See note 86 supra;
Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
88. ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (Bernhard-Altmann); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)
(1970).
89. See notes 9, 17 supra.
90. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1965).
91. See Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 50 L.R.R.M. 1949 (1962).
92. Id.
93. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268, enforced, 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir.
1965). Gissel explicitly approved the Sixth Circuit's decision. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575, 606 (1969).
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and bargaining for it contains a built-in bias toward protracted liti-
gation, and fails to protect employee free choice against union coercion
as well as an election does.
V. An Alternative
A. From Cards to Elections
The problems inherent in authorization cards suggest that the Board
should shift away from reliance on cards and toward reliance on elec-
tions. The Board apparently attempted such a shift in Wilder Manu-
facturing Co.94 The Board refused to recognize the cards, hoping to
force a union that desired recognition to petition for an election.95
The Truck Drivers court thought the Board had gone too far.96
Holding that the employer should not be allowed to ignore the cards,
it offered the suggestion that he should be required to petition for
an election. Even if that holding is left undisturbed by the Supreme
Court, the Board should take a more active role in these situations,
rather than invariably leaving the duty to file a petition with either
the union or the employer. Experience has shown that neither is
willing to petition, always inviting the other to do so in a continual
Alphonse and Gaston routine.9 7 Therefore, when a dispute in which
neither party has petitioned for an election reaches the Board via the
union's filing of a refusal-to-bargain charge, the Board itself should
order an election immediately.
Of course, if the NLRB entered' the dispute too early, the parties
would be prevented from settling their differences on their own. Thus,
the Board should establish standards to define when it will order an
election sua sponte. At a minimum, the Board should not intervene
unless: (1) a union has claimed a card majority and requested recogni-
tion and bargaining from the employer; (2) the employer has refused
recognition and has declined to submit the cards to an impartial third
party for authentication or to agree on some other method of deter-
mining union support;98 (3) both the employer and the union have
refused to petition for an election; and (4) the union has filed refusal-
to-bargain charges.99 Then the Board may resolve the question by
94. 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972).
95. Id. at 1041.
96. Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
97. See, e.g., Wilder Mfg. Co., 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972); Linden Lumber Div., Summer
& Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1971).
98. See Wilder Mfg. Co., 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972); Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
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ordering an election. In effect, a refusal-to-bargain charge would be
treated as a petition for an election.
A Board-ordered election "retains primary emphasis on the election
process."'100 It avoids the necessity of determining union support in
lengthy unfair labor practice litigation, which often takes the form of
calling most of the employees to the stand to testify about coercion or
misrepresentation in the drive.' 0 ' The time lapse between card drive
and trial dulls memories and alters perceptions, making the process
even less reliable than the cards themselves. If the NLRB ordered an
election on its own early in the process, a better method of determin-
ing employee sentiment would supersede the adjudicative process and
render it unnecessary. It would protect the employees' right to desig-
nate a bargaining representative. It would also provide a basis on which
to hold the employer to an objective determination of the union's
status, thus extricating the Board from the good faith thicket.
The proposed solution facilitates another goal. The Act contemplates
that the private parties involved will order their relations through
bargaining and persuasion, and a limited amount of economic force. 0 2
The Act establishes a procedural framework,' 03 with some substantive
limitations on the use of economic force, 0 4 within which private per-
sons conduct their relations. The government intervenes only when
one side violates the procedural requisites or the outer limits on the
use of economic force, or when private ordering breaks down. In the
case of an authorization card dispute, one or all of these may have
happened.'05
If the Board treats a refusal-to-bargain charge as a petition for elec-
tion, it would not be resolving the dispute exactly as presented. On
the face of it, this action might seem to deny private ordering. In a
100. Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
101. See, e.g., Engineers & Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1967);
NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Cumberland
Shoe Corp., 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Koehler, 328 F.2d 770 (4th Cir.
1964). The trial becomes, in effect, a public election. Any unfair labor practices of
the employer that might invalidate an election can have an effect at trial as well.
The employees are aware of the purpose of their testimony, and may tend to slant
their perceptions of events that happened long before trial as a reaction to employer's
threats or promises that invalidated the election.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970); H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 45
(1968); Lesnick, supra note 76, at 867. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935).
103. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935). 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970) es-
tablishes procedures for conducting elections; 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970) establishes pro-
cedures for adjudicating allegations of violations of § 158, which in turn establishes
procedural requisites and definitions of the relations between employer and union,
such as the duty to bargain.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
105. Id. § 160 (1970).
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deeper sense, however, the suggested approach affirms the private
function. Unfair labor practice litigation, which is the ordinary con-
sequence of a refusal-to-bargain charge, makes the Board a mediator
deciding the substantive issues in a private dispute, precisely what
the authors of the Act sought to avoid. 10 6 If instead the Board orders
an election, it essentially washes its hands of the substantive part of
the dispute, dissolves the stalemate, and establishes a procedural frame-
work in which the private parties may continue or resume their own
relations in order to settle the dispute.10 7
One might still argue that the Board's attempt in Wilder Manufac-
turing Co. to encourage an election by not recognizing the cards0 s
promotes private ordering better than the alternative proposed here.10
Indeed, it does favor private ordering, but to the point where the em-
ployer is allowed to escape the commands of the Act. 10 To remedy
this situation, a Board-ordered election is a less intrusive measure than
the suggestion on remand in Truck Drivers that the Board put the
employer to some test of good faith."'
One might still object to the Board's taking such a step on the
grounds that it does not have specific statutory authority to order an
election where the parties have not petitioned for one. Yet there is
nothing in the statute to prevent such an order. In fact, the Act might
be found to give support to the measure in three ways.
First, the statute gives the Board broad powers to effectuate the
policies of the Act." 2 Section 10(a)"13 authorizes the Board "to pre-
vent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice" 4 affecting
commerce." In ordering an election and determining union status,
the Board may well prevent an employer from committing an 8(a)(5)115
violation, refusing to bargain when he has an obligation to do so.
Second, though there is no explicit statutory authority for the Board
to order an election without a petition from an employer or a union,
if the Board makes it known that any 8(a)(5) charge based on a card
majority will be treated first as a petition for an election, then an
8(a)(5) charge is a petition for an election, and it supports the Board's
106. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935).
107. Id.
108. 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972).
109. Id. at 1040-41.
110. Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099, 1111-13 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
111. Id. at 1111.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
113. Id. § 160(a).
114. See id. § 158.
115. Id. § 158(a)(5).
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order. Of course, this would not bar later litigation on the refusal-to-
bargain issue, if the election process totally breaks down.
Finally, the Board might justify its order for an election as an in-
vestigative tool, authorized by section 11(l).116 The Board might find
that since no other investigative method equals a Board-conducted
election in determining employee sentiment, it prefers an election to
the current practice of calling employees to testify regarding union
support and the card drive.117
B. Safeguarding the Election Process
The proposed solution poses no problems where both the employer
and the union have not committed election-voiding unfair labor prac-
tices during the card drive or election campaign. Where the employer
has misbehaved, on the other hand, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.11s
validated the issuance of a bargaining order based on a card majority.
This remedy is less than satisfactory, however. To the extent that the
cards are unreliable, the remedy runs the danger of ignoring the genu-
ine free choice of the employees. Thus the NLRB should hold to the
practice recommended in the preceding section, ordering an election
wherever possible, especially where only the potential of future unfair
labor practices which might void an election exists.""
In such cases the Board's traditional remedies are useful-remedies
such as a cease and desist order,120 posting or mailing of notices, 12'
and a cooling-off period between the time when the unfair labor
116. 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1970).
117. The NLRB could determine an appropriate bargaining unit for the election
it orders in the same manner as now, except that when ordering an election, the
Board would have to request the employer and the union to submit definitions of
an appropriate bargaining unit. If there is a contest, it should provide no greater
delay or problems than under current procedures. See generally C. SuMEas & H.
WELLiNGTON, LABOR LAW 511-48 (1968).
118. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610-16 (1969).
119. Only in the most severe cases should the Board resort to the bargaining order
remedy. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613-14 (1969); J.C. Penney
Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 384 F.2d 479, 485-86 (10th Cir. 1967); United Steelworkers of America
v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Bok, supra note 19, at 134-39. In such cases,
the Board implicitly concludes that no amount of remedial action will undo the
damage done by the employer's unfair labor practices.
120. For an example of a cease and desist order, see Pacific Abrasive Supply Co.,
182 N.L.R.B. 329, 341-42 (1970). The cease and desist order, however, may be of little
value because a transgressing employer is subjected to an ineffective penalty-he is
simply ordered to bargain with the union. Cf. Note, The Ex-Cello and Tiidee Products
Cases-Continuing Controversy Over the Make-Whole Remedy in Refusal to Bargain
Cases, 19 KAN. L. REv. 325, 332 (1971) (retroactively negotiated make-whole remedy).
121. For an example of a notice, see Pacific Abrasive Supply Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 329,
342-43 (1970). Official notices may give the union a small psychological boost, quiet
employee fears of employer retaliation, and discredit future employer threats designed
to frighten away or co-opt union support.
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practices were committed and the time of the election. 12 2 The Board
has an additional weapon authorized by the Act that it has used only
sparingly; it can seek an injunction under section 10(j)' 2 3 against the
respondent in an unfair labor practice proceeding. These four remedies
combined could serve to deter employer misconduct and thereby pro-
tect the election process as a means of determining employee free choice.
C. Toward More Reliable Cards
If employer misconduct has nevertheless been so severe as to pre-
clude a fair election even with the strongest corrective measures, 1 -2 4
then the Board has no choice but to use the next best method for
determining employee sentiment. 2 5 In most cases, that will be the
cards, sometimes supported by other evidence, such as a recognitional
strike126 or a poll of employees.' 27
Reliance on the cards in those situations need not raise any prob-
lems if the Board promulgates rules to increase the reliability of the
cards and to protect employees in the solicitation process.' 28 The rules
122. Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C. L. REv. 209 (1963), found
that certain unfair labor practices, such as threats to close a plant, are more effective
(i.e., they destroy election conditions for a longer period of time than others) and
that if a rerun is held too soon after the election before the effects of the unfair
labor practices have worn off, the chances for a changed result are not good.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 160j) (1970). "Would not an injunction with the sanctions at-
tendant thereto more adequately fulfill the aims of protecting employee-free choice
[sic], and at the same time cause no untoward benefit to either the employer or
union?" Rains, supra note 19, at 230. Authorization card cases present ideal circum-
stances for the § 10(j) injunction. 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1970). The Senate Report on the
Taft-Hartley Act recommended injunctions as a speedy way to preserve the status
quo while the NLRB's slower adjudicative processes settled the underlying dispute.
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 8, 27 (1947).
The Supreme Court has never considered the extent of the district court's power
to issue a 10(j) injunction; the only case on this issue that reached the Court was
mooted prior to decision. McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), rev'd, 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966), stay granted, 87 S. Ct. 5 (Harlan, J.), stay
dissolved, judgment vacated as moot, 385 U.S. 533 (1967). The circuits have disagreed
on the standard to be used to determine whether an injunction is appropriate. The
Eighth Circuit's standard is strict, but an injunction would nonetheless be appro-
priate in the case of potential election-voiding unfair labor practices by the employer.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Morton, 385 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1965). Other
circuits have taken a more liberal view which would clearly permit the use of an
injunction in these cases. Boire v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778 (5th
Cir. 1973); UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Angle v.
Sacks, 382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967).
124. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613-14 (1969).
125. See Sheinkman, supra note 86, at 328; NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson & Co., Inc.,
386 F.2d 551, 554, 556-57 (4th Cir. 1967) (Sobeloff, J., concurring specially). See also
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969).
126. See, e.g., Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
127. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 608-09 (1969); Struksnes Constr. Co., 165
N.L.R.B. 1062, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1967); Hammond & Irving, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1071 (1965).
128. Improving card reliability has been suggested, though only in broad outline,
in Comment, supra note 8.
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need not be complicated. They should require that the cards be un-
ambiguously worded and that they include a statement to the effect
that the solicitor has not coerced the signer, misrepresented the pur-
pose of the card, or instructed the signer to disregard its language. The
cards should state clearly that they are revocable at any time up until
the union presents a bargaining demand to the employer. 129 Finally,
the union should be required to notify the Board's Regional Office
in order to make the drive public and inform the employer. Such
notification would also permit rival unions to enter the card drive.
In addition, the Board should prevent deliberate disregard of the
solicitation rules by denying a card-based bargaining order to a union
that seriously violates the rules, whether or not there is employer mis-
conduct. 130 Such a rule need not penalize a union for minor errors
committed by solicitors, but it would deter continued use of cards of
questionable reliability by encouraging union adherence to the rules.
Less stringent rules might apply when the union seeks to use cards
only to support an election petition. 13'
Card solicitation rules might encourage employers to accept the
cards as a reliable indicator of employee sentiment. Their greater re-
liability would justify their use to support a bargaining order where
a fair election is impossible. And the rules would benefit employers
willing to recognize a union on the basis of signed cards by protecting
them from § 8(a)(1) charges of restraint or coercion of the employees'
129, Though the NLRB need not prescribe the form of the cards, an acceptable
card might be worded as follows:
I, (employee's name, printed), hereby designate (union) as my exclusive represent-
ative for the purposes of collective bargaining about rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other conditions of employment.
I sign this card without any pressure or coercion from (solicitor's name) or from
any employee or union member. I understand that the card will be used to designate
the union as my sole bargaining representative and that it is effective without my
first voting for the union in an election. I understand further that I may revoke or
withdraw my signature on this card, or demand the return of this card at any time
until the union presents a bargaining demand to my employer, supported by cards
from a majority of the employees in my bargaining unit. I have received a copy of
this card signed and dated by the solicitor in order to keep me informed of my
rights and my status with the union.
(date) (solicitor's signature)
(date) (employee's signature)
For examples of card forms, see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 583 nA
(1969); Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099, 1100 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
NLRB v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 351 F.2d 917, 918 (6th Cir. 1965).
130. Cf. Laura Modes Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1592, 54 L.R.R.M. 1299 (1963).
131. Currently, a union usually needs a 30 percent showing of support in order to
file a representation petition. 1969 CCH GuImaooK To LAB. R.L. 402A.
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right to organize and § 8(a)(2) charges of employer-dominated or
employer-encouraged unions.132
The rules would also protect an employee's right to make an in-
formed and uncoerced decision on whether or not to select a bargain-
ing representative. 33 The employees would have more information
on the merits of unionization and of the particular union, because
management would be able to mount its own campaign, pointing out
the problems of unionization or of the union spearheading the drive.
A rival union might serve the same function. Faced with such oppo-
sition, the union that initiated the drive would be forced to put up
its best arguments.
Retaining the card drive gives the union some advantages as well.
In an election, a union must gain and hold its support over a fixed-
length election campaign. In a card drive, the union has more flex-
ibility; it may continue the drive as long as it needs to gain a majority.
The union can thus time its recognition and bargaining demand most
advantageously. Finally, a card drive does not bar another drive for
a year if the union is unsuccessful, as does an election.
Conclusion
Employers and unions have waged a war of attrition over authoriza-
tion cards for long enough. The delays caused by nonrecognition or by
costly litigation only hurt the employees, who are caught in the cross-
fire. Authorization cards should reflect employee free choice far better
than they now do, and elections, long called the "preferred route" for
the designation of a bargaining representative, should be employed
far more readily. As this Note has suggested, there do exist rules and
procedures that the National Labor Relations Board could adopt to
promote those ends; Linden Lumber'3 4 presents the Supreme Court
with an important opportunity to see that the Board does so.
132. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(2) (1970).
133. See notes 23, 24 supra.
134. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1967 (1974).
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